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Abstract 
This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on performance of modern 
Chinese firms. Prior studies reveal inconclusive results about the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Little research investigates the performance 
implications of board structure in the post-institutional-transition era in China. Based on 
agency and resource dependence theories, it examines the impacts of board composition and 
leadership structure on the performance of Chinese manufacturing firms that went public on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2010. The findings show that separating the 
posts of CEO and chairman promotes better performance. However, appointing a larger 
proportion of outside independent directors to the board insignificantly affects performance. 
This research provides partial support for agency theory and extended insights into corporate 
governance in emerging economy firms.  
 
Keywords: agency theory, board independence, CEO duality, China, corporate governance, 
institutional transition. 
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Introduction 
The recent financial crisis and high-profile corporate scandals at Enron, Lehman Brothers, 
WorldCom, and other companies have led stakeholders to take an interest in the construction 
of an effective corporate governance (CG) system (Ehikioya, 2009; Erkens, Hung and Matos,  
2012). A well-functioning CG system leads to the success of the ideal type of firm and 
strategies (Whitley, 2007). Thus it allows the firm to build a foundation for performance and 
shelters it from environmental vulnerability. For emerging economy firms, market supporting 
institutions and a well-functioning CG system enable them to attract foreign investment and 
gain advanced knowledge from multinational corporations (MNCs) through partnerships 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007; Meyer, 2004). Although the emerging economies have benefited 
from foreign investment in recent years, local firms in these economies are often discounted 
in the international capital market due to their underdeveloped and opaque CG systems 
(UNCTAD, 2015). This highlights the importance of CG system for emerging economy firms, 
since the establishment of an effective CG system will help them to attain higher market 
valuations and positions in the international capital market. The CG literature notes that 
various forms of CG exist to ensure that the management endeavors to meet the best interests 
of the shareholders. These include external CG mechanisms (e.g., the market for corporate 
control, institutional ownership and the level of debt financing) and internal ones (e.g., the 
board of directors, managerial ownership and executive compensation) (Barnhart and 
Rosenstein, 1998; Monks and Minow, 2004).  
The board of directors (BOD) plays a particularly important part in the establishment 
of effective CG (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Krause, Semadeni and Cannella, 2013; Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt, 2003) as it directs the firm’s strategy at the apex of corporate level 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Walker and Madsen, 2014). Conventional wisdom states 
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that a more independent board will be more effective and thus it improves firm performance. 
However, the extant literature provides rather mixed results on this (see, e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2000; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003; Xie et al., 2003). Regarding this topic, a majority of prior studies have focused on 
BODs and their performance implications in developed economies. However, each country 
has a different institutional setting, formed by various aspects such as the economic 
environment, government regulations, and level of development of the financial markets 
(Berry, Guillén, and Zhou, 2010; Khanna and Palepu, 2004; Li, Cui, and Lu, 2014). In 
comparison with the CG of developed economy firms, different institutional settings known 
as the rules of the game, such as more concentrated ownership and weaker legal constraints, 
will affect the CG practices of emerging economy firms (Klapper and Love, 2004; Wright et 
al., 2005).  
This research examines the extent to which independent corporate board structure 
affects the performance of Chinese firms that have gone public since China’s institutional 
transitions (cf. Peng, 2004; Peng, Zhang, and Li, 2007). This approach is relevant in the 
emerging economy context and fills some gaps in the emerging market CG literature.  
There has been an ongoing controversy regarding the influence of the BOD on firm 
performance between two theoretical approaches, i.e., agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jenson 
and Meckling, 1976) and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Peng 
et al., 2007). Although the debate remains unresolved in the literature, two practices, namely, 
(1) appointing outside directors to the board and (2) separating the posts of CEO and 
chairman (CEO non-duality), have been advocated by governments of emerging economies 
experiencing institutional transitions, including China (Peng, 2004). The ‘China Securities 
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Regulatory Commission’ (CSRC)1, the regulatory government body, has been developing and 
improving institutional framework for the CG of listed companies in China and joined the 
international standard-setting ‘International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO)’ Technical Committee in 20092 (OECD, 2011; 2015). This marks that China has 
moved to the post-institutional-transition passing through transitions eras from 1980s to early 
2000s regarding CG. Nevertheless, whether these practices mandated through statutory 
regulations really pay off in terms of improved financial performance still remains unknown. 
As such, this study develops and tests hypotheses regarding the influences of BOD 
composition and leadership structure on firm performance in the modern Chinese context. 
The application of the relationship based on agency theory fits the current research as Chinese 
state-owned-enterprise (SOE) reforms and CG guideline changes have been taking place in 
China (Aivazian, Ge and Qiu, 2005; Hassard et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2007; Tian and Lau, 
2001). As such, this research integrates CG research with agency and resource dependence 
theories to develop and test a comprehensive explanation of the implications of board 
structure in the post-institutional-transition era in the emerging economy of China. It 
investigates aspects of independent corporate board structure and performance and to this end, 
it aims to answer the following research question: Do board independence and CEO duality 
affect financial performance in China, and if so to what extent?  
The contribution of this research to the CG literature is two-folds. First, previous 
                                         
1 The ‘Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies’ is regulated by the CSRC in China (see 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn). 
2 We acknowledge institutions are in a state of flux in emerging economies and even developed economies (see 
Brexit). China’s financial markets have continued to experience transitions. However, from the CG perspective 
we view that joining to the IOSCO technical committee requires China to significantly change the CG-related 
legal framework. This can be seen as the critical evidence that the unstable institutions become stabilized and 
improved, comparing with the unstable institutional transition periods from 1980s to early 2000s (see e.g., 
Berglöf and von Thadden, 2000; Hassard et al., 2006; Lin and Germain, 2003; Tanner, 1999; McCann, 2014; 
OECD; 2011; Reuter, 2015). 
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studies on Chinese CG are limited and their empirical results are rather mixed (Bai et al., 
2004; Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Peng et al., 2007; Tian and Lau, 2001). By focusing on the CG 
practices of emerging economy firms, this research extends the literature on the impact of 
board independence on firm performance during China’s institutional transition period (cf. 
Peng, 2004; Peng et al., 2007) to that in the post-regulation period. Second, it investigates 
whether the prevalent institutional regulatory change towards more outsiders on boards leads 
to better financial performance in the modern Chinese context. Thus, it offers a nuanced 
implication that management needs to formulate strategies for the establishment of well-
functioning CG structures that can contribute to improving firm performance. In so doing, it 
provides deeper insights for various stakeholders, including foreign and domestic investors, 
shareholder activists, managers, and public policy makers.  
Research context 
The research context of this paper is newly initial public offering (IPO) firms in 2010 on 
either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
had a total of 894 firms and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange had a total of 1,169 listed firms in 
2010. From these listed firms, we focused on 102 newly listed firms on the Shanghai and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010 in the manufacturing sector. 
There are two important reasons for the selection of the research context. First, the 
research sets to illustrate the changing institutional environment and the impact of new 
regulations in particular, the introduction of new regulations following China joining IOSCO 
in 2009. In addition, the CSRC significantly improved securities legal framework and market 
transparency by 2009. For example, the CSRC (2011) disseminated the guidelines and 
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promulgated several important regulatory documents3 , including Compilation Rules for 
Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities to the Public No.15 and 
Compilation Rules for Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities to the Public 
No. 9. 
Second, when transitioning to an IPO stage although all publicly listed firms may 
associate with the ‘common law’ of CG, varying industries will differ in important ways that 
lead to expect differences in formal regulatory setting of the IPO firms’ characteristics. There 
are other institutional factors at play that may influence regulatory environment. This study 
focuses exclusively on newly listed manufacturing firms in China which operate within a 
similar regulatory environment. This was due to many of Chinese manufacturing SOEs 
experienced the SOE reforms (McCann, 2014; Motohashi and Yun, 2007; Wang et al., 2009) 
which set the performance impacts of the SOE restructuring measures on CG more 
observable. 
The post-institutional-transition period after 2009 is thus chosen for this research 
setting. Moreover, the year 2010 is chosen as the base year in this research for the following 
reasons. Thus we collected data from 2010 onward is relatively well updated and the 
information disclosure requirement imposed on publicly listed firms is stricter than before 
that date (CSRC, 2011). Furthermore, the number of IPOs in 2010 was much greater than in 
previous years (CSRC, 2011), making the research sample large enough for our research 
purposes. The required information on board composition and board leadership structure was 
obtained from the sample firms’ prospectuses for share offering and IPO statements. Thereby, 
the focus of newly listed firms in the manufacturing sector in 2010 provides a useful research 
context for the study of the CG-performance relationship in the post-institutional-transition.  
                                         
3 The CSRC (2011) issued and disseminated three types of regulations and 40 normative documents in 2010. 
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Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Theoretical background 
There are various forms of CG, safeguarding the firm to meet the shareholders’ interests. 
Such forms include external ones including the market for corporate control, institutional 
ownership, and the level of debt financing, and internal ones such as the board sub-
committees, managerial ownership, and executive compensation (Monks and Minow, 2004). 
As discussed earlier, this research is particularly interested in internal CG (i.e., board 
independence) and its financial performance implications. The BOD is defined as a body of 
appointed executive individuals who jointly direct and oversee a firm, thus directing the 
firm’s strategy and performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Luoma and Goodstein, 
1999; Monks and Minow, 2004). The BOD has three main functions: strategic, control, and 
resource dependence. First, it is responsible for setting a vision and corporate goals, and 
formulating, implementing, and evaluating strategies. It also has the ability to bring external 
resources to the firm, including both human and financial resources. Second, it has the power 
to select, dismiss, and compensate senior management team based on performance appraisals. 
Lastly, it embeds in social networks and communicates itself with external actors in the 
environment (Withers, Hillman and Cannella, 2012). The BOD plays these important roles in 
the firm, and is expected to resolve conflicts of interests between the various stakeholders, 
including the shareholders. Thus, the structuring of BOD is of crucial importance. This 
section reviews two theories adopted in this research, i.e., the agency and resource 
dependence theories.  
Agency theory has been widely used in CG research (Fama, 1980; Jenson and 
Meckling, 1976). Its first assumption is that information asymmetry between shareholders (as 
principals) and managers (as agents) in the free market economy results in ineffective agency, 
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high agency costs, and losses to the shareholders. Both principals and agents are viewed as 
rational individuals who are self-seeking and opportunistic – the agents are concerned with 
their own salaries, status, and security rather than the shareholders’ returns. Thus, there is an 
inherent conflict between the benefits to the shareholders and to the managers (Tian and Lau, 
2001). Under these circumstances, motivating managers to maximise shareholders’ returns 
instead of acting in their own interests is the fundamental role of the BOD (Fama, 1980). 
Effective monitoring and control systems should also be established to discipline managers 
and protect shareholders’ interests. In this vein, agency theory advises having a substantial 
number of independent external directors on the board and the separation of the posts of CEO 
and chairman (i.e., CEO non-duality) (OECD, 1999; 2015). Specifically in China, statutory 
regulations and government CSRC guidelines in recent years reveal a near consensus in favor 
of strengthening board independence (see OECD, 2011). 
Some scholars focus on the social networks in which firms are embedded (Scott, 
1991), and thus the significance of these interlocking directorates for power within society. 
Such research provides the foundation of the resource dependence theory, which argues that 
the board is an important tie between the firm and the resources in the external environment 
(Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The more resource-
abundant outside directors are appointed to the board to help bring external resources into the 
firm, the better the organisational outcomes are (Peng, 2004). As such, bringing in outsiders 
with social-network links to strategically associated enterprises facilitates companies’ 
strategic decision-making process (Withers et al., 2012). The resource dependence role of the 
board is more pronounced in specific institutional contexts, such as that in China: ‘Both the 
Chinese cultural propensity to rely on relationships (guanxi) to get things done and the 
institutional imperative to activate social network ties during institutional transitions are 
claimed to be behind the highlighted role of resource dependence’ (Peng, 2004, p.455). 
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Although resource dependence theory underemphasises the alternative functions of the board, 
such as strategizing, counseling, and monitoring (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), it complements 
agency theory as it explains how resource- and information-constrained internal boards can 
take advantage of external expertise.  
In all, it would be challenging to explain the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance based on a single theory (Bozec and Bozec, 2012). ‘The 
combination of these two theoretical perspectives is consistent with the earlier work […] that 
asserts boards of directors serve two important functions: monitoring management on behalf 
of shareholders (agency theory) and bringing in essential resources (resource dependency 
theory)’ (Jackling and Johl, 2009, p.494). As shown in Figure 1, drawing on agency and 
resource dependence theories the following section develops hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between board composition and leadership structure and financial performance4.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
Independent board composition 
In developed economies, it is generally recommended that publicly traded firms in the stock 
market should appoint a sufficient number of independent external directors to mitigate CG 
risks and failures, based on the Cadbury Report of 19925 (ICAEW - The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 2015; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). This 
recommendation has been widely adopted to varying degrees by the World Bank, the EU, the 
                                         
4 There are different approaches to analyzing board independence, looking at elements such as board sub-
committees (e.g., the audit committee, remuneration committee, and nomination committee that perform specific 
board duties) and director ownership (e.g., the view that director ownership motivates directors to take the day-
to-day business seriously and to act in the best interests of the firm). The focus of the current research is board 
composition (board independence) and leadership structure (CEO non-duality).  
5 In advanced economies such as the UK, the US, Germany, and Japan, governments set up codes of CG for 
firms. Examples include the Cadbury, Hampel and Turnbell Reports in the UK, the Business Roundtable in the 
US, the German Code of Corporate Governance, and the Corporate Governance Principles in Japan. These codes 
of conduct largely advocate board independence based on agency theory.  
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US, and many other countries, including China (Peng, 2004). Although board independence 
has been widely proposed in government CG guidelines as an effective approach for 
improving firm performance, extant studies provide rather mixed empirical results on the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance.  
Drawing on agency theory, it is argued that firms are continually confronted with 
agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Tian and Lau, 2001). Managers 
are likely to sacrifice shareholders’ interests for their own benefit when conflicts arise. Hence, 
a BOD with the statutory right to employ, dismiss, and compensate managers will promote 
shareholders’ wealth and mitigate CG risks (Williamson, 1984). The BOD should be 
objective and independent in order to achieve the monitoring goal. As such, it should 
comprise a minimum number of independent directors (Tian and Lau, 2001; Weir and Laing, 
2001). Independent directors can serve their roles as a member of the BOD more effectively 
than inside and affiliated directors because they have no material relationship with the firm. 
In contrast, inside and affiliated directors are likely to be manipulated by the self-serving 
managers and collude with them to maximise their personal interests at the expense of the 
firm. However, the previous studies on board independence and financial performance 
provide inconclusive results, including positive (Peng, 2004; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997), 
negative (Hossain, Cahan and Adams, 2000; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003) and no relationship 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Thus, it seems that this association is influenced by the 
research context (Peng et al., 2007).  
Institutional pressures such as government-driven formal regulations can impact on 
board composition and subsequent changes in firm performance. For instance, Dahya and 
McConnell (2007) analyze the impact of board composition changes on financial 
performance in the UK over the period of 1989 through 1996, during which time the Cadbury 
Report was published. Their results indicate that firms that appointed more independent 
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directors to conform to the standard experienced a significant increase in operating profits and 
stock prices. Also, the Principle of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999) emphasises that a 
board should include a sufficient number of independent directors, who can express 
independent opinions, monitor managers’ behaviours, and settle conflicts of interests between 
principals and agents. In a similar vein, since 2003, the committee of the CSRC has urged 
publicly listed firms in China to make at least one-third of the five to nineteen members of the 
board they must appoint independent directors (CSRC, 2003). In the Chinese context, boards 
consist of three different types of director: inside, affiliated, and independent. Inside directors, 
who are quite familiar with the firm, have direct responsibility for managing daily operations. 
Affiliated directors represent the ‘sponsor enterprise’ (SOEs before the reform) of the 
‘shareholding company’ (a limited liability shareholding company since the Chinese SOE 
reform) (Aivazian et al., 2005; Hassard et al., 2006). The shareholding company and the 
sponsor enterprise are affiliated because the sponsor enterprise continues to provide services 
and rent facilities to the shareholding company. Independent directors are those who do not 
have a material relationship with the focal shareholding firm or its affiliated firms. There are 
three types of independent director on a typical Chinese board: those connected to the state, 
those from financial institutions, and academics (Tian and Lau, 2001).  
Arguably, a greater representation of independent directors on a board will provide a 
broader view regarding the company’s strategic affairs. Compared with inside directors, they 
are more acute when it comes to seizing business opportunities and identifying potential 
problems. In addition to independent directors having professional knowledge and diverse 
experience, they are often capable of offering specialised advice on business issues and 
making better decisions. Also, from the resource dependence perspective, appointing 
independent directors who have abundant social network ties to strategically related 
organisations and thus access to valuable resources can bring such resources within the firm’s 
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boundaries, thus producing economic rents (Peng, 2004; Withers et al., 2012). This is more 
pronounced in China’s cultural and institutional environment, which relies more heavily on 
social relationships than formal contracts to get things done (Peng, 2004). Based on the above 
discussion, we suggest the following hypothesis:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, a greater representation of independent directors on the board 
positively influences the financial performance of new publicly listed firms in 
China. 
CEO duality 
According to agency theory, the division of responsibilities of the top management in a firm 
should be clearly defined, such that no single person has unlimited decision-making authority. 
For instance, the UK government’s CG guidelines recommend that the posts of CEO and 
chairman be separately held, in what is known as CEO non-duality6 (see Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2012; ICAEW, 2015). The CEO is responsible for formulating and implementing 
corporate strategies and managing the firm’s functional activities, while the chairman directs 
the work of the board and monitors the performance of the CEO (Weir and Laing, 2001). As 
such, the chairman also has the power to oversee and control top managers’ behaviours 
(Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997). In so doing, an independent non-executive chairman is 
able to express objective opinions on strategic issues, monitor board decisions, and protect 
shareholders’ interests. 
Drawing on agency theory, it can be deduced that CEO duality may result in 
autocratic leadership and operational inefficiency in a firm, which are detrimental to its 
performance. The combination of the two posts is likely to result in unfettered decision-
                                         
6 Among 34 OECD countries, only 14 governments require or recommend CEO non-duality (OECD, 2015). 
The CSRC has no regulations on the combination of the role of board chair and CEO of listed firms in China. 
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making power being held by one individual, which destroys the promotion of operational 
efficiency and the achievement of outstanding financial outcomes. Thus, dual leadership 
status makes it difficult for directors to be objective and honest when evaluating 
organisational outcomes, which, in the long run, causes poor financial performance (Carver, 
1990). It is necessary to appoint an independent non-executive chairman to restrict the 
decision-making discretion of top managers (Brickley et al., 1997). As such, separating 
decision management from decision control can largely reduce agency costs and promote the 
financial performance of publicly traded firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
However, proponents of CEO duality aver that combining the two roles saves on the 
additional compensation required to maintain two positions, and reduces conflicts between 
the CEO and directors, thus promoting the achievement of the firm’s goals. Since the CEO is 
more familiar with management issues in the firm, an experienced CEO can deal efficiently 
with complex management challenges (Lam and Lee, 2008). Prior empirical research on the 
effect of CEO duality on firm performance is rather inconclusive (Krause et al., 2013), 
including findings of positive (Peng et al., 2007; Tian and Lau, 2001), negative (e.g. Daily 
and Dalton, 1994; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), and no relation (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Wu et al., 
1998), and of a mixed relationship (e.g., Baliga, Moyer, and Rao, 1996; Lam and Lee, 2008). 
These mixed results indicate that a universally optimal leadership structure may not exist. 
Thus, firms should choose the most suitable board leadership structure for their own business 
climate.   
Compared with the era of the command economy, the new legal framework 
comprising laws such as the Bankruptcy Law and the State-owned Industrial Enterprises Law, 
introduced in the 1980s helped to improve the autonomy of Chinese firms in terms of split 
ownership and control (Lin and Germain, 2003; Tanner, 1999). Later, in the 1990s and 2000s, 
the Company Law governing limited liability companies and joint stock companies in 1993, 
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many Chinese SOEs’ business structures were improved and zombie firms were even 
expelled by the government (Berglöf and von Thadden, 2000; Hassard et al., 2006; McCann, 
2014; OECD; 2011; Reuter, 2015). These legal and institutional frameworks for CG have also 
restructured Chinese firms’ business towards the China-specific market economy. Thus, it is 
likely that the board leadership structure will be significantly improved in comparison to the 
period of institutional transition (cf. Peng et al., 2007). Since these changes, an independent 
non-executive chairman is more likely to express an impartial voice on important corporate 
strategic issues and to scrutinise managerial behaviours. The separation of the posts of CEO 
and chairman enhances the monitoring capability and power of the board. This separated 
corporate leadership will eventually lead to a more effective CG structure and better financial 
performance in the period since China’s institutional transition. Thus, we suggest the 
following hypothesis:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, CEO duality negatively influences the financial performance of 
new publicly listed firms in China. 
Methods 
Sample and data collection  
We collected data from 110 Chinese manufacturing firms that went public in 2010 on either 
the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The study sample is confined to publicly 
listed firms, due to the assumption that these firms apply the rules and standards set by 
regulatory bodies in carrying out their business activities (Ehikioya, 2009). In addition, listed 
firms are predicted to disclose their financial information in compliance with the authoritative 
accounting standards. We excluded highly diversified firms from the sample to minimise 
industry effects (Murthy, Rosenstein and Rangan, 1993; Tian and Lau, 2001).  
The sample firms’ business focuses include manufacturing sectors such as special 
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equipment manufacturing, universal equipment manufacturing, computers, communications, 
and other electronic equipment manufacturing. They all operate within a similar regulatory 
environment, such that substantially different CG-performance relationships will not be 
present. Also, many Chinese SOEs in the manufacturing sector went through the SOE 
reforms (Motohashi and Yun, 2007; Wang et al., 2009). Thus the performance impacts of the 
SOE restructuring measures on board independence are likely to be more obvious. This 
setting provides an ideal research context for the investigation of the CG-performance 
relationship.  
Insert Table 1 here 
We collected the sample firms’ performance data from their annual reports in 2012, 
two years after IPO. The year 2012 was chosen due to consideration of the time-lag issue. To 
be more specific, the CG structure and mechanism regarding board independence may not 
have an instant effect on financial performance. We judged that it would be better to observe 
the financial performance impact two years later. Prior studies on CG and performance also 
deal with the time-lag issue in this way (Barnhart et al., 1994; Bhagat and Black, 2000). Also, 
new IPO firms may manipulate financial information and conceal potential problems so as to 
gain a foothold in the market. Thus the financial data in 2010 and 2011 may be relatively 
inauthentic and unreliable for the 2010 IPO firms. In addition to the above sources, data were 
collected from Thomson DataStream, the China Statistical Yearbook, and the Stockstar to 
complement the data set. At the end, eight firms were deleted because of missing CG or 
financial information during the investigated period. The screening procedure left a total of 
102 firms that are used in this research. 
Measurement  
Regarding the independent variables, board composition (INDEP) is measured by the 
Pre-print (non-publisher’s document) 
17 
proportion of independent directors, that is, the ratio of the number of independent directors 
to the total number of directors. CEO duality (DUAL) is a dichotomous variable with 1 
standing for ‘duality’ and 0 for ‘non-duality’.  
As for the dependent variables, measures of firms’ financial performance fit into two 
accounting-based measures, i.e., return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) (Tian 
and Lau, 2001). ROA is calculated as the ratio of net profit to total assets, indicating a firm’s 
efficiency in generating earnings by making use of its assets. ROE is calculated as the ratio of 
net profit to shareholders’ equity, revealing how well a firm utilises investment to achieve 
profits. Another reason that ROE is emphasised in Chinese research is that the CSRC has 
published regulations regarding ROE since 1996. It stipulates that ‘a new public listed firm’s 
ROE has to be at least 10 percent in each of the three most recent years and an already listed 
firm has to keep its ROE positive for three consecutive years to avoid being delisted’ (Peng et 
al., 2007, p.214).  
We control for variables that could affect firm performance. The first control 
variable is board size, which is measured as the total number of directors at the time of the 
IPO. If the board size is large, directors with specialised knowledge and diverse types of 
experience can work together to make superior decisions. Directors with more ties to the 
external environment can also bring in required resources, thus enhancing firm performance. 
However, a small board has its own benefits. Members of a small board are familiar with 
each other, and they are willing to participate frankly in discussions. Thus, it is much easier 
for a small board to reach consensus and achieve operational efficiency. The second variable 
is firm age, which is measured as the number of years that the firm has existed since 
incorporation. Firm age is included as a control variable for the reason that old firms in China 
may benefit from a stable supply of resources and rich industrial experience (Tian and Lau, 
2001). We control for firm size, measured as the firm’s total assets when it initially went 
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public. Because of the heavy skewness in firm size, the log transformation of this variable is 
employed to ensure a normal distribution. Large firms have encountered more difficulties 
than small and medium-sized one when adjusting to a market-oriented economy (Tian and 
Lau, 2001). The last control variable is market munificence, which indicates the extent to 
which the industry environment supports organisational outcomes. Following the previous 
literature (Dess and Beard, 1984; Tian and Lau, 2001), market munificence is measured as the 
three-year average growth rate of industry-level sales revenue. Table 1 summarises the 
research measures.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Results 
The descriptive statistics for the study variables are summarised in Table 2. The average 
proportion of independent directors on the board meets the one-third requirement prescribed 
by the CSRC (2003). However, since the CSRC does not clearly prescribe an optimal board 
leadership structure, Chinese public companies are free to choose whether or not they 
separate the positions of CEO and chairman. Around half of the sample firms (49 out of 102) 
combine the two roles while the rest (53) separate them, which is similar to the findings in 
Tenev, Zhang and Brefort’s (2002) report on the leadership structure of Chinese publicly 
listed firms. The least independent board is composed of 33% independent directors, while in 
the most independent board more than half of the directors are independent. On average, in 
the sample, the board includes 37% independent directors. The small standard deviation 
reveals that the data points are quite close to the mean, indicating that most boards contain 
around 37% independent directors. This is in compliance with the CSRC guideline that 
stipulates that one-third of the board should be made up of independent directors. The 
smallest board contains five directors and the largest thirteen, which shows that all the sample 
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firms follow the CSRC guideline on board size. The average board size is eight to nine 
directors, with a standard deviation of 1.59. Based on the log transformation of firm size, 
most firms are similar in size, close to the mean of 9.20. With regard to market munificence, 
the three-year average growth rate of industry-level sales revenue ranges from 0.09 to 0.19, 
with a mean of 0.154 and a standard deviation of 0.036. It is thus apparent that most firms 
have an industry-level sales revenue growth rate of 15%. On average, firms generate earnings 
of 4% (ROA) and 3.64% (ROE) by making use of corporate assets and shareholders’ equity.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Hypothesis test 
We conducted preliminary analyses to ensure there was no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity, and multicollinearity in the sample. As the independent variables are not 
highly correlated (r<0.7), as shown in Table 2 and all VIF values are less than 1.5, there is no 
serious issue with multicollinearity in the sample. The presence of outliers is checked by 
inspecting the normal P-P plot. The data points lie in a roughly straight diagonal line from 
bottom left to top right, which assures us of a normal distribution. Most of the data points are 
concentrated in the centre around the origin and no standardised residual is beyond the range 
of -3.3 to 3.3 in the scatterplot; thus no outlier is present. The data are therefore appropriate 
for the regression analysis.  
Next, we tested the hypotheses using multiple ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. The results are presented in Table 3. For each dependent variable, Models 1, and 3 
include only the control variables, and Models 2 and 4 contain both the control variables and 
the independent variables.  
We find that no control variable significantly affects ROA, and the R2 value in 
Model 1 is very low (R2=0.041). After entering the two independent variables (i.e., INDEP 
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and DUAL) in the second step, the proportion of independent directors and CEO duality as a 
whole explain an additional 10% of the variance in ROA, even when the influences of board 
size, firm age, firm size, and market munificence are controlled for. There is no significant 
association between INDEP and ROA. Hence, H1 is not supported. However, DUAL has a 
significantly negative effect on ROA (b=-0.328, p<0.01), indicating that firms that separate 
the posts of CEO and chairman (i.e., CEO non-duality) have better accounting-based 
performance. Thus, H2 is supported. 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 present the regression results for ROE. The control 
variables are entered in the first step, and only explain 4.1% of the variance in ROE. After the 
two independent variables have been entered, the total variance explained by the whole model 
is 13.6%. Thus, the two independent variables explain an additional 9.5% (ΔR2=0.095), after 
controlling for board size, board age, firm size, and market munificence. As for the individual 
multiple regression coefficients, INDP insignificantly affects ROE (b=0.031), but DUAL has 
a negative effect on ROE (b=-0.321, p<0.01). This result indicates that separating the posts of 
CEO and chairman would result in better accounting-based performance. Firm size has a 
negative effect on ROE (b=-0.234, p<0.05), but the other control variables have an 
insignificant relationship with ROE. Taking these results together, in this research only H2 is 
supported, suggesting that ‘CEO non-duality’ has a strong positive effect on accounting-
based financial performance. This finding is consistent with the agency theory.  
Insert Table 3 here 
Post-hoc analysis 
Accounting-based measures such as ROA and ROE may be manipulated and distorted 
(Dalton et al., 1998). Market-based measures, on the other hand, represent the current market 
value placed on the firm, and are not distorted by accounting depreciation policies, asset 
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valuations, historical financial information, and current operations (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
Thus, market-based performance measures (e.g., stock return, Tobin’s Q), which attach great 
importance to the firm’s prospective profitability, could be used to complement accounting-
based measures. Also, market-based measures take shareholder investment risks into 
consideration, thus reflecting risk-adjusted firm performance (Nayyar, 1992). Thus, following 
previous studies (Garg, 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Tian and Lau, 2001), we test the 
relationship between CG and market performance. Tobin’s Q can be calculated as the ratio of 
the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets. However, due to the 
unavailability of some of the variables used to calculate Tobin’s Q, Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) 
alternative formula is employed as an approximation to it. Namely, Tobin’s Q is calculated as 
the sum of the market value of common stock, the book value of preferred stock, and the 
book value of long-term debt, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Regarding the effect of the two independent variables (i.e., INDEP and DUAL) on 
market-based performance, neither of them significantly affects Tobin’s Q. Although the 
hypotheses are not supported, the results are not entirely against our expectations. The 
proportion of independent directors has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q (b=0.065), while CEO 
duality has a negative effect (b=-0.144). Taking these results together, we conclude that in 
this research ‘CEO non-duality’ has a positive effect on accounting-based financial 
performance. 
Discussions and Conclusion 
CEO non-duality leads to better financial performance 
Our results show that CEO duality had a negative impact on the accounting-based 
performance (ROA and ROE) of listed Chinese manufacturing firms in 2010 (supporting H2). 
This negative association in China’s post-institutional-transition era is contrary to Peng et 
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al.’s (2007) study that found a positive relationship during the transition era from 1992 
to1996. CEO non-duality allows the BOD to exercise its oversight function more effectively, 
which promotes financial performance (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). The CEO is 
responsible for managing daily business activities, while the BOD, situated at the apex of the 
internal control system, has the ultimate accountability for the functioning of the firm (Jensen, 
1993). When the CEO holds both posts, one person controls the firm and holds unrestricted 
decision-making power. In such cases, the board is likely to become a ‘rubber stamp’ 
provider, dominated by the CEO (Abdullah, 2004). Thus, a board that is highly controlled by 
the top managers is incapable of overseeing the management effectively. This kind of 
structure will eventually lead to the destruction of shareholders’ interests and organisational 
outcomes, thus incurring high agency costs (Ellstrand, Tihanyi and Johnson, 2002; Su, Xu 
and Phan, 2008). Conversely, an independent non-executive chairman can evaluate strategic 
proposals objectively and fairly. As an agent, the CEO is able to inspect and monitor 
managers’ behaviours effectively. Thus, separating the roles of CEO and chairman puts the 
board in a powerful position, outside the influence of the managers. This will ultimately pay 
off in the form of a sound CG system and improved financial performance. Following 
institutional transitions such as the SOE reforms and regulatory changes to CG, a majority of 
the new Chinese firms that have gone public in the manufacturing sector are now moving 
towards developing more efficient CG systems.  
The separation of ownership and control between CEO duality and non-duality 
structure can have a significant impact on firm performance (Baliga et al., 1996; Krause et al., 
2013). Our finding advances research on corporate leadership structure by highlighting the 
significance of CEO non-duality in the Chinese post-institutional-transition era. However, 
within the complex nexus of CG-firm performance, CEO non-duality may not an all-round 
solution for designing and implementing an effective CG system, and institutions are in a 
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state of flux in emerging economies (even in some of developed economies). Thus, the 
impact of other institutional factors (e.g., state ownership and political ties) on firm 
performance would be considered in the context of China (Kowalski et al., 2013; Krause et 
al., 2013; Zhu and Yoshikawa, 2016).  
Regarding the results of the post-hoc analysis, impact of dual leadership status on 
market-based performance, the relationship is insignificantly negative. This is probably due to 
the underdeveloped capital markets in China. For instance, the turnover ratios of China’s two 
stock exchanges are much higher than those of the US stock exchanges (see Economic 
Research, 2016; Liu, 2006; Xu and Wang, 1999). Chinese investors hold shares for only one 
or two months on average, while the mean holding period for shareholders in the US is 
eighteen months (Peng et al., 2007). Given the relative inefficiency of China’s capital 
markets compared to those of advanced economies, it is unlikely that any positive effects of 
board leadership structure would be reflected in the sample firms’ market-based financial 
performance measures such as Tobin’s Q.  
Insignificant relationship between independent board composition and financial 
performance   
Our results indicate that independent board composition does not affect financial performance 
(H1 rejected). Compared with independent directors, inside and affiliated directors are not 
subject to the information asymmetry problem. Thus, inside and affiliated directors in China 
are better at making strategic decisions based on timely and reliable information (Tian and 
Lau, 2001). As inside and affiliated directors are well informed and familiar with the 
complexities of the firm’s business, they are capable of responding quickly to potential 
market opportunities and operational problems. In addition, inside and affiliated directors can 
easily access human and financial resources within the firm (Bhagat and Black, 2000). Under 
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these circumstances, they are less likely to collude with managers to pursue personal interests 
at the expense of shareholder interests. Unlike them, independent directors who own a small 
proportion of the firm’s stocks may have limited incentives to oversee the management with 
sufficient care and passion (Adithipyangkul and Leung, 2015; Ma and Khanna, 2016).  
To date, including shareholders’ own representatives on the BOD has been restrained 
by the current government regulations of China (Bhagat and Black, 2000). There could be 
other reasons for the insignificant relationship between board independence and financial 
performance. First, independent directors are hired only on a part-time basis and are likely to 
be busy with their own business. Therefore, it is difficult for them to devote themselves to 
monitoring other firms, and they may lack the required expertise to understand professional 
business issues and have limited accessibility to timely and accurate internal information 
(Weir and Laing, 2001). As was mentioned earlier, compared with internal and affiliated 
directors, the reward and punishment mechanism for independent directors is not well 
developed in China (Ma and Khanna, 2016). Independent directors who own trivial amounts 
of their firm’s stocks are not motivated to perform their oversight roles conscientiously. This 
may lead to further negligence of duties, which would be detrimental to firm performance. In 
fact, board independence has only been assigned high importance by Chinese firms in recent 
years. Its effects on firm performance are unlikely to materialise instantly. Also, many 
underlying problems appear because of the immature and underdeveloped independent 
director system. For example, as China lacks a comprehensive mechanism for assigning 
responsibilities and providing training to independent directors, some may be unskilled in 
overseeing and monitoring. Further, unlike firms in developed economies, most Chinese 
firms lack non-executive-director-led nomination committees for appointing independent 
directors (Tenev et al., 2002). In their absence, ‘the nomination process of independent 
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directors may not be truly independent and highly depends on the availability of gifted 
individuals’ (Abdullah, 2004, p.52). As the appointed independent directors are not 
guaranteed to be independent and objective enough, there is a large possibility that they will 
not contribute in the same way that competent independent directors would. Thus, 
independent directors will only bring benefits to Chinese firms if they are embedded in a 
well-developed general Chinese board mechanism. 
Another important reason for the rejection of H1 could be due to the Chinese 
institutional context. The average percentage of independent directors on the boards studied 
meets the one-third requirement prescribed by the CSRC (2003). However, outside directors 
are not truly independent of the management as they have some material relationship with the 
firm (Abdullah, 2004; Tenev et al., 2002). For instance, some independent directors hold 
posts as paid consultants or some are hired by foundations sponsored by the firms themselves, 
and others have personal relationships with the managers, compromising their independent 
judgment (Bhagat and Black, 2000). Independent directors tend to be more generous in 
determining a CEO’s remuneration if they were selected during that CEO’s term of office 
(Holthausen and David, 1993). These outside directors, who have personal relationships with 
top managements, will not make objective judgments or take effective control of the board 
(Garg, 2007). Emerging economies such as China have not developed such a sound market 
mechanism yet (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng et al., 2007). Under an underdeveloped 
institutional environment of this sort, truly independent directors may not be appointed to 
boards (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012).  
Relational and social capital known as guanxi is critically important for the 
formation of business relationships in China (Peng, 2004; Tsui and Farh, 1997). Business 
activities are controlled more by public relations than by formal agreements (Tian and Lau, 
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2001). It is assumed that a greater representation of inside and affiliated directors on its board 
will add value to a firm. In comparison with independent directors, inside and affiliated 
directors will be much more familiar with the top managers. The well-developed social 
interdependence will help them to communicate comfortably with each other. Thus, they are 
more likely to have a comprehensive understanding of business affairs and make superior 
strategic decisions. Also, appointing outside independent directors may be more applicable to 
individualistic and low-power-distance cultures such as the US and UK. China has a 
relatively collectivistic and high-power-distance culture, valuing interpersonal relationships 
and collective achievement (Berry et al., 2010; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 1997). As a 
result, a greater representation of independent outside directors on a board may not bring 
many benefits in the Chinese institutional context. However, we cautiously expect that if the 
strong and efficient market assumption held for China then the impact of board independence 
on financial performance might be positive as we expected, providing possible support for 
both agency and resource dependence hypotheses.  
Implications for managers and policy makers  
This research shows that board independence, as has been advocated by conventional wisdom, 
may not always improve financial performance. This finding is of great importance for MNCs 
operating in emerging economies such as in China. Any such corporation planning to apply 
the Anglo-American CG model to a subsidiary in China will probably need to be flexible in 
adapting its CG structure to fit the Chinese institutional environment. In such cases, a greater 
representation of independent directors on the board may not always provide much of a 
payoff. But, CEO duality is generally detrimental to financial performance in China. Through 
the establishment of a separated board leadership structure, the chairman can exert more 
effective control over the top management team and concentrate on primary duties such as 
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strategic decision making. However, the design of the board leadership structure may be 
contingent on a firm’s size or business scope and the challenges it faces (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003). For instance, for firms engaging in complex value-chain activities, separating the 
leadership structure would be a reasonable solution for the effective management of diverse 
resources and expertise spread across the firm’s boundaries. 
Our study provides implications for government policy makers. As developed 
economies published CG guidelines related to board independence in the 1990s, the Chinese 
government followed this trend, laying down regulations such as that concerning the 
minimum representation of independent directors on boards. However, CG requirements vary 
considerably with an individual firm’s institutional environment (Krenn, 2016; Rahman, 
2009). Thus, a specific public regulation prescribing ideal forms of board composition and 
leadership structures would be less applicable in economies where institutional settings are in 
a constant state of flux. Our results provide a nuanced implication that adopting a uniform 
board structure may not always result in superior firm performance in emerging economies 
(cf. Bozec and Bozec, 2012). In this vein, the proposed implementation of mandatory 
adjustments to CG standards may need to be cautiously evaluated prior to the execution of 
government policies (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). 
This research demonstrates that CEO non-duality positively influences on 
accounting-based financial performance in the Chinese manufacturing sector while a greater 
representation of independent directors on the board does not. As such, agency theory is 
partially supported and separating the posts of CEO and chairman rather than combining them 
is more likely to pay off with improved financial performance. We conclude that no single 
CG theory could completely explain the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance, but they are complementary in specific circumstances. Thus, the choice of 
board structure for each firm will be endogenous and the benefits of a certain structure should 
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be weighed against the potential costs. For instance, when the managerial ownership is high, 
managers’ interests in a firm will be as great as those of the other shareholders. Under such 
circumstances, the need to include a large proportion of independent directors to oversee the 
managers could be much lower. Provided that the employment of independent directors has 
real and opportunity costs, it may be better for such a firm to recruit fewer independent 
directors to the board. Independent directors would be less important in such a firm than in 
one whose managers have mastered specialised skills and face no rivalry for their jobs. 
Overall, although a separated leadership structure promotes a firm’s financial performance, a 
greater representation of independent directors on a board does not affect performance in 
China’s post-institutional-transition era in the manufacturing sector. Thus, board 
independence, as has been advocated by conventional wisdom and government standards, 
may not always guarantee improved firm performance. 
Limitations and future research  
Some limitations exist in this research. First, in this study the sample is restricted to a cross 
section of 102 Chinese manufacturing firms that went public in 2010. When interpreting the 
empirical results of this study, the relatively small sample size limits the generalizability to 
other industry contexts. Also, although the time-lag issue is taken into consideration and 
performance data collected two years after transitioning to IPO (Barnhart et al., 1994; Bhagat 
and Black, 2000), the actual length of the time lag is unknown. Regarding the insignificant 
relationship between board composition and financial performance, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that such results might be due to the inaccurate estimation of the time lag. A 
longitudinal study with larger panel data would be needed to estimate whether the 
relationship identified by this research exists over time. In so doing, the changing patterns of 
board structures and their effects on firm performance could also be better identified.  
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Second, other explanatory variables (e.g., the percentage of director ownership and 
the structure of board sub-committees) are not included in the model due to data 
unavailability. The impact of three different types of independent directors (e.g., state, 
financial institutions, and academics) on performance would be very interesting as they may 
be related to specific types of resources (e.g., political, industry experience, and academic 
knowledge). We recommend that future researchers include these variables in their models.  
Third, additional control variables are needed to be included in the future research. 
For instance, CEO entrenchment (e.g., CEO age, tenure and compensation) could be used as 
control variables. Without controlling for these variables, we cannot entirely negate a 
possibility of an underestimation of the contribution of CEO duality to financial performance 
in the model (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999). In addition, future researchers consider 
including measures of leverage, state ownership, and growth opportunities as control 
variables. In this study the sample is restricted to a cross section of Chinese manufacturing 
firms that went public in 2010. We suggest future studies expand the industry types and treat 
them as industry dummies to capture board-industry effects.  
Although in this research we focus on the board and leadership structures as they are 
constituent parts of an effective internal CG system, other external CG mechanisms (e.g., 
market for corporate control, legal framework, and product market competition) should not be 
neglected in CG research (Liu, 2006; Walsh and Seward, 1990). Thus, it is suggested that 
future studies comprehensively include both internal and external CG mechanisms in the 
model to examine their explanatory power. Also, it would be potentially interesting to 
compare these relationships among indigenous local firms, international joint ventures, and 
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in China.  
When examining CG, there have been two contrasting views put forward about 
whether governments should intervene to regulate CG (see Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). 
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Proponents argue that uniformed governance structures mandated through guidelines make 
control more effective, so that top managers are monitored more effectively, which improves 
firm performance and protects shareholders’ interests. However, it is costly for governments 
to impose uniform CG on firms due to differing governance demands and interests that 
depend on their specific regulatory and economic environments. Thus, the opposing view is 
that monitoring and control mechanisms should be left to the market. These contrasting views 
raise the question of whether a uniform governance mechanism is necessary to discipline 
management and improve firm performance. However, the current research cannot assess this 
issue as it investigates only the period after the government mandate in the Chinese context. 
We suggest future researchers compare the post-regulation period to pre-regulation, thereby 
identifying whether uniform governance structure driven by the government is more effective 
in monitoring and firm performance. Lastly, there is a trend of being dual-listed in emerging 
market MNCs. So comparing dual-listed versus non-listed Chinese firms would be an 
interesting future research avenue.  
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Figures and Tables 
   
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 
 
 
Table 1. Measurement  
Variable Measurement 
Proportion of independent directors 
(INDEP) 
Number of independent directors/ Total number of directors 
CEO duality (DUAL) 1 for duality, 0 for non-duality 
Board size (BSIZE) Total number of directors at the time of IPO 
Firm age (FAGE) Number of years the firms has been existed 
Firm size (FSIZE) Firm’s total assets at the time of IPO 
Market Munificence (MUNI) 
Three-year average growth rate of industry-level sales 
revenue 
ROA Net profits / Total assets 
ROE Net profits / Shareholders’ equity 
Tobin’s Q 
(MV of common stock + BV of preferred stock + BV of 
long-term debts) / BV of total assets. 
Note: MV: market value; BV: book value. 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-print (non-publisher’s document) 
37 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for study variables 
Variable Mean SD 
Correlation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. INDEP 0.365 0.057 -         
2. DUAL 0.480 0.502 0.153 -        
3. BSIZE 8.540 1.487 -0.558** -0.205* -       
4. FAGE 12.520 4.012 0.077 0.022 -0.106 -      
5. FSIZE(lg) 9.200 0.357 -0.007 -0.214* 0.198* -0.160 -     
6. MUNIF 0.154 0.036 0.036 0.096 -0.120 0.136 -0.205* -    
7. ROA 0.040 0.062 -0.067 -0.291** 0.063 0.079 -0.106 0.150 -   
8. ROE 0.036 0.179 -0.021 -0.267** 0.011 0.111 -0.177 0.039 0.830** -  
9. Tobin’s Q 2.019 1.423 0.037 -0.088 -0.037 -0.043 -0.118 0.291** 0.511 0.311** - 
N=102,  *p < 0.05 (two-tailed),  **p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 3. Results of regression analysis  
 ROA ROE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant - - - - 
BSIZE 0.103 0.049 0.055 0.019 
FAGE 0.700 0.047 0.089 0.078 
FSIZE -0.090 -0.148 -0.174* -0.234* 
MUNIF 0.136 0.151 -0.002 0.013 
INDEP  0.000  0.031 
DUAL   -0.328**  -0.321** 
F 1.037 2.591 1.041 2.492 
R2 0.041 0.141 0.041 0.136 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.086 0.002 0.081 
N=102,  *p < 0.05 (two-tailed),  **p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
